How Saturn Cars Work

General Motors' first new nameplate in over 60 years was born in 1982 as Project Saturn. Conceived in part by then-chairman Roger Smith, it was an all-out effort to stem the growing Japanese dominance of the U.S. small-car market that had begun in the early '70s.


Smith realized that although GM was highly successful with traditional American cars, it badly lagged behind Japanese makers for small-car quality, design, and cost. As a result, younger buyers were deserting GM's smaller U.S. products for Hondas, Toyotas, and other Japanese models -- and they weren't coming back.



More Saturn Information

Saturn was conceived as an all-American way to compete in the small-car market. Check out these sites for more on Saturn.

•Saturn New Car Reviews and Prices
•Saturn Used Car Reviews and Prices



More than eight years passed before the first Saturns were sold. For some, that long gestation reinforced doubts that GM could field a competitive, profitable, all-American small car -- especially given recent efforts like the problem-plagued X-body front-drive compacts.

Heady pronouncements along the way didn't help. For example, at the November 1983 unveiling of a full-scale sedan prototype (later dubbed "the little red car"), Smith promised Saturn would be a "a quantum leap ahead of the Japanese, including what they have coming in the future. In Saturn we have GM's answer -- the American answer -- to the Japanese challenge. It's the clean-sheet approach to producing small cars that in time will prove to have historic implications."


Originally, Saturn vehicles were to be sold by Chevrolet, starting with a front-drive four-door sedan somewhat smaller than a contemporary Chevy Cavalier. The projected price was $5000-$7000 and its introduction was vaguely described as sometime in "the late '80s." A two-door coupe and a sport-­utility vehicle (SUV) were to follow later.

By the time Saturn opened for business, however, it was Saturn Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary charged with pioneering new ideas in everything from styling to service. The most successful innovations would then spread throughout GM itself, or so it was presumed. Saturn was supposed to make money, of course, preferably by stealing sales from the competition, not other GM makes.


In presenting the prototype, GM served notice that Saturns would be different: Body panels would be made of either metal or plastic and attached to a steel "spaceframe" as on Pontiac's then-new Fiero sporty car. The engine would be a brand-new, fuel-injected four-cylinder with an aluminum block and cylinder heads formed by a precision "lost foam" technique. Oil passages would be designed in instead of drilled in after casting to save both time and material. Astonishing EPA-rated fuel economy was promised: 45 mpg city, 60 mpg highway.

Other components need not come from corporate bins, and Saturn was free to devise its own engineering and manufacturing methods. A major goal for this experiment was finding ways to close the cost gap with "Japan, Inc.," then estimated at more than $2000 per car. The resultant savings, Smith said, would finally make GM a small-car power in the U.S. market. In fact, he declared Saturn nothing less than "the key to GM's long-term competitiveness, survival, and success."


As announced in January 1985, Saturn Corporation would have its own plant, its own employees, its own contract with the United Auto Workers union, and a separate dealer network. Initial funding was $150 million, and up to $5 billion was earmarked for future expenditures, including some $3.5 billion for a "greenfield" factory in Spring Hill, Tennessee.

Smith hoped production would start by fall 1987, and vowed to drive the first car off the line himself. Oldsmobile general manager Joseph Sanchez was tapped as Saturn president, but died of a heart attack less than three weeks later. Pontiac general manager Bill Hogland was named to replace him.
Saturn Rethinks Car Manufacturing
Saturn, a division of GM founded in the 1980s, had its own dedicated car factory from the beginning. A prime reason for locating in Tennessee was to distance Saturn from other GM facilities, thus allowing a unique "corporate culture" to flower more easily.

Just as important, tiny Spring Hill (pop­ulation 1400 at the time) was about 35 miles south of Nashville and 30 miles from Smyrna, Tennessee, home of Nissan's North American factory, so vital railroad lines, interstate highways and suppliers were all conveniently close. Groundbreaking took place in April 1986, by which time fledgling Saturn, barely a year old, had its third president: Richard G. "Skip" LeFauve, transferred from GM's Buick-Olds-Cadillac Group after Bill Hoglund, LeFauve's predecessor at Saturn, was named to head that unit.


Saturn's self-proclaimed mission was to "market vehicles developed and manufactured in the United States that are world leaders in quality, cost, and customer enthusiasm through the integration of people, technology, and business systems and to exchange knowledge, technology, and experience throughout General Motors."

That was a tall order for an established car company, but Saturn was starting from scratch. The job was monumental, and ensuing months witnessed delays, cost overruns, and difficulties in signing up dealers that forced pushing back the production start date to summer 1990, shortly before GM Chairman Roger Smith's scheduled retirement. Yearly volume was first set at a half-million units, then reduced to a more manageable 240,000, and GM's total investment was trimmed to about $3.5 billion.


Smith envisioned the Saturn plant as the last word in automated manufacturing, with computer-guided vehicles delivering parts to robots that did most assembly chores. But like so many GM leaders before him, Smith was a financial manager, not an engineer or manufacturing expert, and he didn't really understand "high tech" or its limits.

Spring Hill would use robots for welding, applying adhesives and painting the cars, but the plant wasn't nearly as futuristic as Smith envisioned. The real innovation came in labor/management relations. As LeFauve noted: "People are going to make the difference for Saturn."


The first employees were recruited from other GM operations. There were just 3800 jobs but more than 16,000 applicants, all evidently intrigued by the Saturn experiment and wanting to be part of it. Candidates were invited to Spring Hill for a two-day screening session, and 90 percent of those who came were hired.

The eventual employee roster showed migrants from 46 states with an average of 13 years GM experience. Being so accustomed to GM's old ways, "associates" were required to undergo comprehensive training in the new Saturn way of thinking and working.


UAW members received 350 hours of training on average, though some high-skill positions got twice as much. Base pay for all workers was 80 percent of GM's national average, but there were bonuses for meeting productivity targets and a ­profit-sharing plan -- if Saturn turned a profit.

Saturn's labor agreement had few traditional industry "shop rules" and gave employees more say in how they did their jobs. Workers were organized into teams responsible for monitoring the quality of parts and their own work, and any worker could stop the assembly line to fix safety or quality problems on the spot, a common practice in Japan but unknown in U.S. auto plants.

That allowed doing away with separate quality-control inspection areas. In addition, workers sat alongside managers in meetings, helping to make decisions as "team members," and everyone ate in the same dining room. LeFauve even shared the executive office suite with the UAW's Saturn coordinator.


The team approach also figured in Saturn product development. Designers, factory workers, engineers, and outside suppliers came together for what was called "simultaneous engineering." This was in sharp contrast to the old way of having designers, once finished with their part of the car, "throw it over the wall" to engineers, who did their jobs before tossing the project to manufacturing, and so on down the line.

Just as important, Saturn planners, some of whom already drove imports, put aside personal preferences to focus on what buyers wanted. Said engineering vice-president Jay Wetzel: "Most great cars in history reflect the personality of one person. In our case, that person just happens to be the consumer."
Early Production of Saturn Cars
Despite myriad obstacles and much outside naysaying, Saturn production got under way in time for model-year 1991. Job One, a metallic-red sedan, rolled out the door at 10:57 a.m. on July 30, 1990, with Roger Smith at the wheel in one of his last public appearances as GM chairman. With that, attention turned to the car itself.

Saturn greeted the world with four-door sedans and two-door coupes sharing a basic front-drive platform and major components. Each body style had its own styling, but neither drew rave reviews on that score.




The 1991 Saturn SL2 -- part of Saturn's initial model line -- was a little more
expensive but performed surprisingly well.



The sedan was criticized as looking like a scaled-down Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme. (Some designers apparently worked on both, with the Saturn finished before the Olds but introduced after it.) The coupe, a swoopy 2+2 with hidden headlamps, was more favorably received, though some said it resembled the Geo Storm, an Isuzu-built hatchback coupe then sold by Chevrolet.

Despite the shared platform, the sedan rode a 102.4-inch wheelbase, the coupe a 99.2-inch span. Respective overall lengths were 176.3 and 175.8 inches, making Saturns a little shorter than Chevy Cavaliers but seven inches longer than a Honda Civic, a key design benchmark.

As promised, body panels bolted to a steel inner skeleton, with fenders, doors, and other vertical panels made of dent- and rust-resistant thermoplastic polymer ­material. Steel was used for hoods, trunklids, and roofs. Galvanized underbody panels and a standard stainless-steel exhaust system helped reduced corrosion worries, too.


Also as promised, the engine was a new inline-four created expressly for Saturn, with an aluminum block and heads cast by the lost-foam technique. There were two versions of this 1.9-liter (116-cubic inch) design, both fuel-injected and mounted transversely per established front-drive small-car practice. The base 85-horsepower unit had a single overhead camshaft (sohc) and throttle-body injection with a central squirter at the intake manifold. A dual-cam (dohc) derivative with multi-point injection (a squirter for each cylinder) delivered 123 bhp.

Each teamed with five-speed manual transmission or optional electronically controlled four-speed automatic. As on some Japanese cars, the automatic had a switch for selecting "normal" or "performance" shift modes; the latter delayed full-throttle upshifts to higher rpm for best acceleration. Alas, no Saturn powertrain delivered anywhere near the economy touted seven years earlier -- 45 mpg city and 60 mpg highway. The best was 27 mpg city and 37 highway for the single-cam/five-speed combination.


Initially, the sedan was offered in price-leader SL and better-equipped SL1 models with the sohc engine and as a dohc-powered SL2 with "Twin Cam" writ large on the rear bumper. The coupe, dubbed SC, was dohc only. Bumpers were black on ­single-cam cars, body-color on the sportier dual-cam models.

Interior design and features mimicked those of targeted competitors. Climate controls and the steering-column stalk switches for lights and wipers might have been lifted from a Civic or Toyota Corolla, and all models came with reclining cloth front bucket seats, tachometer, tilt steering column, trip odometer, split folding rear seatback, and a rear electric defroster -- items found on most all Japanese rivals.

Wheel designs emulated Honda's, including the use of four lug nuts instead of GM's usual five. With all this, some people thought Saturns were Japanese cars, but content was actually 95 percent domestic.


Early road-test verdicts were generally positive. Despite automatic transmission, Consumer Guide®'s test SL2 ran 0-60 mph in 8.8 seconds, surprisingly brisk for an affordable subcompact. A single-cam car took up to two seconds more, but Saturn's slick-shifting manual transmission was a match for Japan's best and a welcome change from previous GM efforts.

All models offered agile handling, a comfortably absorbent ride, good people and cargo space for the exterior size, and, of course, convenient Japanese-style ergonomics. Fuel economy was another asset, but most reviewers judged the engines too loud and rough, especially for a modern four-cylinder under 2.0 liters. Which led to the most-telling judgment of all: Despite all-new engineering and the long gestation, Saturn was not the big breakthrough Roger Smith had promised -- competitive with the Japanese, but not clearly superior.


Where Saturn did have an edge was price. At $7995 to start, the Scrooge-special SL was a whopping $1495 less than the base Civic sedan and $1000 less the cheapest Corolla (though the SL didn't offer an automatic transmission or power steering). Saturn's $275 destination charge was in line with those of Japanese makers and $180 less than Cavalier's.

The SL1, starting $600 above the SL, swiftly became the volume seller. The SL2 listed at an attractive $10,295, but could be optioned up to around $14,600 -- a bit steep for the class, though that included antilock brakes (ABS) with rear discs (an $895 option) and CD player, features Civic and Corolla didn't yet offer. The SC2 topped the line at $11,775 and, like most other small coupes, was a tougher sell than the sedans.
Saturn Emphasizes Customer Service
Saturn sales officially began on October 25, 1990. Advertising never mentioned a GM connection -- arguably wise, considering GM's sullied reputation among the targeted buyers, though also appropriate for Saturn's freewheeling status.

The Saturn plant at Spring Hill, Tenn., was still moving slowly on a single shift to assure the highest possible assembly quality, now a must for even entry-level cars. The first Saturns were sold by some 30 dealers in Tennessee and neighboring states as well as on the West Coast, long an import stronghold. Dealers opened in other areas as production ramped up. By the following spring, Saturn counted 130 "retailers" in 33 states, most of them in 70 major urban markets.

It was in the retail area that Project Saturn had its greatest impact. Saturn carefully selected dealers who agreed to build separate showrooms and service facilities and to operate under strict guidelines for customer treatment. Sales personnel were trained in "consultative selling" to replace hard-sell tactics. A "retail associate" would sit down with customers, discuss their needs, explain their options, and arrange a test drive.

Pricing would be just as buyer-friendly. Federal laws on price-fixing prohibit car companies from forcing dealers to sell at a set price. That's why window stickers carry the legend "manufacturer's suggested retail price." But Saturn strongly urged its dealers to avoid the usual haggling, saying no customer should ever wonder about paying too much. Dealers agreed, and Saturns sold at full retail price -- no more, no less.

With production slowed to solve nagging quality problems, demand quickly exceeded supply during the 1991 model year. A good thing, then, that dealers obeyed another Saturn commandment: Thou shall not gouge. Buyers used to seeing "added dealer profit" signs on popular cars were pleasantly surprised by Saturn's "no ups, no extras" policy.

The red-carpet treatment didn't end there. Buyers were given a tour of their dealer's service area and met the mechanics who would work on their cars. Before driving off, new owners were photographed in their Saturns amid rousing cheers from dealership employees.

Almost all dealers invited owners in for weekend service clinics and even a free lunch. They also followed up with customers on a regular basis after the sale. If for any reason an owner was unhappy with a Saturn, the car could be returned within the first 30 days or 1500 miles for a full refund, no questions asked.

When Saturn announced its first recall in February 1991, dealer technicians drove to where the owners were just to replace a seatback bracket on about 1200 cars. A few months later, Saturn learned a supplier had provided a batch of improperly formulated antifreeze that might cause engine damage. Instead of replacing the antifreeze, Saturn replaced more than 1100 cars.
Saturn Car Company: Buyer Satisfaction
Saturn's extraordinary approach to customer care drew derisive comments from competing dealers, but it worked. With the Spring Hill factory managing only 48,629 units the first model year, dealers sold every one they could get. Most customers were ecstatic. Some even volunteered to help sell Saturns on their days off.


Another key part of Saturn's sales strategy was giving dealers broad "market areas" so they would compete with other brands instead of each other. Thus, a metropolitan region like Chicago might have more than 60 Chevrolet stores but only nine or 10 Saturn dealers. Limiting the number of retail outlets helped Saturn become the industry leader in sales per dealer, and Saturn franchises quickly became both profitable and sought-after.


Saturn Cars Image Gallery



In Saturn's early days, 50 percent of customers bought a Saturn for the buying
experience -- only 25 percent went for products like this 1991 Saturn SC.
See more pictures of Saturn cars.



This new way of doing business got an immediate endorsement in the form of J.D. Power and Associates' 1991 surveys of new-car owners. Respondents ranked Saturn third in both customer satisfaction and sales satisfaction. In its very first year, the "different kind of car company" leapfrogged Honda, Toyota, Nissan, and other rivals in two key measurements: how well customers liked their cars and how well they were treated by dealers. Only Lexus and Infiniti, the new Japanese luxury brands whose cars sold for three and four times as much, ranked higher.

And this was no first-year fluke. Saturn again ranked No. 3 in both Power surveys for the '92 and '93 model years, and was No. 1 in sales satisfaction and third in customer satisfaction for '94 and '95. More impressive still, Saturn would remain tops in sales satisfaction each model year through 2001 except for 1999, when it tied for sixth with Lexus and Germany's BMW at a mere four points behind first-place Cadillac and Jaguar.

These and other accolades buoyed values of used Saturns, which retained a higher percentage of their original price than other cars in their class. Saturn's own research showed that fully 50 percent of its customers bought primarily for the positive shopping experience, versus 25 percent for the product itself. This led one Saturn executive to remark, "We're not trying to sell people a car. We're helping them buy a car."


Other brands scrambled to "Saturnize," hoping to boost their customer satisfaction and sales with it. Struggling Oldsmobile, in fact, soon implemented many of Saturn's policies in the "Oldsmobile Edge" program. Some other dealers switched to "one-price" and "no-haggle" appeals, but many of those also selling other brands eventually returned to high-pressure tactics.

As Saturn President Richard G. "Skip" LeFauve observed, Saturn's success stemmed from many factors, including being true to its mission statement. "You can't just tell your retailers to be nice to people," he said.


For more information on Saturn cars, see:


•Saturn New Car Reviews and Prices
Saturn Car Company's Early Success
Saturn's first big product change occurred late in the 1992 model year: an optional driver-side airbag. The cars had been introduced with motorized shoulder belts to meet the federal require­ment for dual front-seat "passive restraints," but Japanese rivals were rapidly adding airbags and Saturn needed to match them. The motorized belts continued through model-year '94.


The driver-side cushion became an across-the-board standard for 1993, when four-door wagons and optional traction control arrived. The wagon, striding the same wheelbase as the sedan and otherwise identical to it ahead of the rear doors, came in sohc SW1 and dohc SW2 versions.

Also added was a lower-cost coupe, titled SC1, with the single-cam engine and exposed headlamps. The dual-cam coupe retained its hidden-headlamp face as the SC2.

The new traction control was available for just $50 on models ordered with ABS and automatic. There was hardly any hardware involved. Saturn simply wrote new software allowing the ABS computer to counteract wheel slip in three stages: retard spark timing to reduce engine power, shift the transmission to a higher gear, and interrupt fuel flow. Traction control was a Saturn class exclusive and thus a big coup for the brand; even many luxury cars didn't have it yet.


Saturn production finally hit full stride during model-year '93. Spring Hill ran two shifts to crank out some 244,000 cars, almost 75,000 more than the year before. But dealers were still short of stock and asking for more, so a third shift was added and all shifts rescheduled to four days a week, 10 hours a day. That had the plant going six days a week to squeeze out nearly 60,000 additional cars each year.

The cars themselves were little changed for '94, but there was big news on the financial front. In January 1994, Saturn announced its first operating profit, achieved in calendar '93, though the amount wasn't made public. The workforce had grown to 8500 by then, and each employee received a profit-sharing check for about $5100.

Though Saturn was still a long way from paying back GM's initial investment, officials hastened to point out several benefits accruing from the new company. On the technology side were the lost-foam engine casting technique, a new water-borne paint process, and team-oriented assembly systems, all being adopted or studied by other GM operations.

In addition, Saturn's four-cylinder cars were earning valuable corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) credits for GM as a whole to offset sales of gas-guzzling V-8 models, including a fast-rising number of thirsty full-size light trucks.

Most important perhaps, 75 percent of Saturn sales represented "plus business," meaning they came at the expense of non-GM brands. More than half of Saturn owners said they would have bought a Japanese car instead, thus realizing one of Roger Smith's goals -- stealing customers from the likes of Honda, Toyota, and Nissan.


To say thanks, Saturn invited its customers -- all 700,000 of them -- to a "Homecoming" weekend in Spring Hill in late June 1994. It was another extraordinary thing for a car company to do, but even Saturn was surprised when more than 44,000 ­people showed up. All came at their own expense, some driving in from as far away as Alaska and Hawaii.

Drenching rains and muddy fields didn't dampen the family-oriented fun, which included plant tours, picnics, a concert, and sharing the gospel with fellow owners and Spring Hill workers. Two employees from Pennsylvania Saturn retailers got married during the event; Saturn President Skip LeFauve gave the bride away, plus a 1995 Saturn as a wedding present.

Beyond great PR, the Homecoming testified to how well Saturn was making friends and fostering customer loyalty. It was judged a success, despite the soggy weather and other problems, and would be repeated in 1999.

Step 10: Getting ready for the buying cycle.

At this point you should have considered all the cars in the class that interest you. You should have a good idea what you can afford. You should know if you want to buy or lease your next car. You should have test-driven your top choices.

Now it's time to narrow your choices down to one car and make a deal. If you plan on leasing, read "10 Steps to Leasing a New Car". If you are going to buy your next car, read"10 Steps to Buying a New Car" or "10 Steps to Buying a Used Car." In either case, take a moment to congratulate yourself. You have done your homework to find the right car for you. Now you can move forward with confidence.

Step 9: After the test drive.

After the test-drive, you should leave the car lot. Why? You will probably need to drive other types of cars at other dealerships. It's a good idea to do your entire test-driving in one morning or afternoon. Driving the cars back-to-back will help you uncover differences that will lead to an educated purchase decision.

So, how do you get out of the clutches of the salesperson? Generally, Internet salespeople are pretty mellow and won't pressure you to buy on the spot. Besides, you can say you still have other cars to drive and you can't make a decision yet. Most good salespeople will respect that. If they don't, you won't want to deal with them anyway.

Step 8: How to test drive a car.

The test-drive should replicate the conditions the car will be used in after you buy it. If you commute, drive the car in both stop-and-go traffic and at freeway speeds. If you frequently drive into the mountains, try to find some steep grades to climb. Drive over bumps, take tight corners and test the brakes in a safe location. Get in and out of the car several times and be sure to sit in the backseat, especially if you plan on carrying passengers. In short, ask yourself if you can live with this car for a number of years.

While you are evaluating the car, don't be distracted by the salesperson's pitch. Don't drive with the radio on — evaluate that separately. A new car is a big investment; make sure you spend enough time really looking it over. Then consider one last thing: your intuition. If you are uneasy about the car, follow your instincts. A vehicle purchase decision is too important (and expensive) to undertake without total confidence.

Step 7: Schedule an appointment for a test drive.

It's a good idea to make your initial contact with a dealership by phone or e-mail before going there in person. This can give you a sense of the sales style you will be dealing with throughout the buying process. Additionally, if you can establish a rapport with the Internet salesperson, it will boost your confidence before you visit the lot. Call the Internet department (sometimes called the fleet department) and ask if the car you're looking for — in the right color and trim level — is actually on the lot.

Make your initial contact with the Internet manager either via an e-mail message or a phone call. You can also send multiple dealer requests and narrow your search based on the e-mail responses. Call the Internet department and tell the salesperson that you want to set up a test-drive — but that you won't be buying right away. However, assure them that you will buy there if you decide to purchase this particular model, and if they can offer the vehicle at a fair price.

If you deal with a normal car salesperson, he or she will try to start the negotiations at a high price with the expectation of being negotiated down. However, the Internet manager will often quote you a rock-bottom price right away. A few minutes taken to set up an appointment with the Internet manager can save you both time and money.

Step 6: Research options.

In the past, car buyers have been trained to visit local dealerships to find the car they want. In the Internet age, this is a waste of time and money. You can quickly cover more ground by shopping online. Car dealers are waking up to this new breed of shopper and have created Internet departments within their dealerships to serve the educated buyer. The only things you have to do in person are test-drive the car and sign the contract. And in some cases, you can even have the car delivered to you by the salesperson.

On Edmunds you can not only educate yourself about cars, but also find local dealers,check interest rates for buying or leasing and calculate your exact monthly payment. Before ever heading out the door or negotiating with an Internet manager, take the time to research the cars you are considering. Remember: You don't want to make a large purchase like this until you're really ready.

Step 5: Have you considered all of the costs of ownership?

Here is an often-overlooked fact of car ownership: One car might be cheaper to buy, but more expensive to own. Why? Even if two cars cost about the same to buy, one can depreciate at a different rate or cost significantly more to insure or maintain.

Before you commit to one car, you should estimate the long-term ownership costs of the vehicle you are considering. These include depreciation, insurance, maintenance and fuel costs. True Cost to Own ^® presents this information in an easy-to-read table.

Another valuable tool is Edmunds.com's True Market Value (TMV^®) pricing to find out what a fair price is for the car you are considering. TMV is the average price other buyers are paying for the same car in your area.

By using TMV and TCO, you can make a smart decision up front and then save hundreds of dollars over the life of the car.